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[Can the World Trade Organisation become a body for 
addressing human rights issues? As an international body the 
the WTO is growing in stature. However moves to encompass 
human rights concerns are unlikely to go unchallenged by 
developing nations, and the WTO’s internal rules add another 
layer of complexity. Trade sanctions can be a blunt weapon in 
human rights campaigns.]  
 
‘Pursuant to the WTO, each Member is free to determine the values 
to which it gives priority and the level of protection it deems 
adequate for such values. This would include any societal value 
elected by a WTO Member… [T]he only control exercised by the 
WTO is whether the member is in good faith when invoking such 
non-trade values or whether it is hiding a protectionist device. This 
control is exercised by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism has not up to now given trade 
policy rules precedence over other multilateral rules.1’ 
 
Director–General of the WTO Pascal Lamy, 2005.   
                                                
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University. 
** Rachel Ball is currently undertaking postgraduate research in the US. She cowrote 
this article in her capacity as a research assistant at the Castan Centre for Human 
Rights Law at Monash University.  
This article is part of the outcomes of an ARC grant on ‘The WTO and Human 
Rights’ awarded to the Monash Faculty of Law. We wish to thank Rupert Watters for 
his research assistance and Professor Sarah Joseph for comments on the drafts.  
1 Pascal Lamy, ‘Towards Global Governance?’ (speech delivered at the Master of 
Public Affairs inaugural lecture at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, 21 
October, 2005).  
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The World Trade Organization [WTO]2 is an institution that supervises rules 
regarding the liberalisation of trade in goods3 and trade in services,4 as well 
as rules regarding the protection of intellectual property.5 It also serves as a 
forum for the negotiation of new trade agreements amongst its Members. At 
the time of writing, there are 150 State Members of the WTO.  
 
Whilst the WTO generally pursues a free trade agenda, it does not condemn 
the use of trade measures to achieve non-trade objectives in all 
circumstances. The most obvious example of its flexibility in this regard is 
the TRIPS Agreement which provides a mechanism under which trade 
restrictions can be used to protect intellectual property rights. If the WTO can 
accommodate objectives other than the promotion of free trade, what can it 
do for human rights?  
 
For a number of years academic scholars have been debating this question. 
Generally, human rights advocates identify two ways in which human rights 
could play a role in WTO operations. First, there is the view that WTO rules 
should be reformed, structured and applied in such a way as to maximise 
promotion of human rights objectives; that is that there should be greater 
linkage between the international trade and human rights regimes.6 Second, 
there is the question of the extent to which the existing trade regime can be 
utilised to promote or at least not undermine the enjoyment of human rights. 
This article will deal with one aspect of the latter issue: whether trade can or 
should be used as a weapon to protect and promote human rights.  
                                                
2 Established in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, opened for 
signature April 15, 1994, 1867 UNTS 154 (entered into force 1 January 1995). 
(‘Agreement Establishing the WTO’).  
3General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Agreement Establishing the WTO, 
Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187 (‘GATT’) 
4 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 
1B, 1869 UNTS 183. (‘GATS’) 
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Agreement 
Establishing the WTO, Annex 1C, 1869 UNTS 299. (‘TRIPS’). 
6 See, eg, Gudrun Monika Zagel, ‘WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages and 
Suggesting Convergence’ (Voices of Development Jurists Paper Series Vol.2 No.2, 
International Development Law Organization, 2005); Marco C.E.J. Bronkers, ‘More 
Power to the WTO?’, (2001) 4(1) Journal of International Economic Law 41; 
Thomas Cottier, ‘Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover’, (2002) 5(1) 
Journal of International Economic Law 111, and “Symposium: The Boundaries of 
the WTO”, papers published in (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law.  
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The introduction of an Agreement which uses the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism (DSM) to enforce human rights law is manifestly unrealistic. 
Decisions within the WTO are made by consensus7 and therefore require the 
support of all member states. Given the patent objections to the inclusion of 
human rights in the trade regime by developing countries in particular,8 it is 
extremely unlikely that such a massive amendment to the function and 
mandate of the WTO could ever occur. What remains is the possibility that 
the WTO could accommodate the unilateral human rights-based trade 
measures instituted by member states. Trade measures are a powerful tool. 
After the use of force, they are perhaps the most effective means by which 
one state can impose its will on another.9  
 
The question that is examined here is whether Pascal Lamy was correct in his 
assertion that “each Member is free to determine the values to which it gives 
priority and the level of protection it deems adequate for such values.”10 
Section II looks at the various ways in which a state may use trade measures 
to protect and promote its human rights values. Section III examines the 
jurisprudence from GATT and WTO panels and Appellate Bodies and 
concludes that only in certain cases will WTO law allow member states to 
utilise trade measures to protect human rights. The final section evaluates this 
arrangement from a human rights perspective. It discusses a number of 
reasons why an expansion of a state’s legal right to protect human rights 
through trade measures would be counterproductive.  
 
 
II CLASSIFYING HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED TRADE MEASURES 
 
Human rights related trade measures can be divided into two broad 
categories: ‘inwardly directed’ and ‘outwardly directed’ measures.11 
Inwardly directed measures are those intended to protect human rights within 
the implementing country. For example, Country A’s law prohibiting the 
                                                
7 Article IX of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, above n 2. 
8 See below in section IV.A.2. 
9 Carlos Manuel Vazquez, ‘Trade Sanctions and Human Rights – Past, Present, and 
Future’ (2003) 6(4) Journal of International Economic Law 797. At 797-801 
Vazquez discusses the evolution and interplay of international law concerning the use 
of force, human rights and trade.  
10 Lamy, above n 1.  
11 Vazquez uses these terms, above n 9, at 812.  
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import of diseased poultry (designed to protect the right to health of Country 
A’s population)12 would be an inwardly directed measure.  
 
Outwardly directed measures, more commonly known as sanctions, are those 
that aim to change practices in other states. Outwardly directed measures can 
be further sub-divided into country-based and product-based sanctions. 
Country-based trade measures discriminate against goods with reference to 
nationality. For example, the general sanctions on goods from Burma which 
have been imposed by the US pursuant to the Burma Freedom and 
Democracy Act (2003) can be classified as country- based trade measures.13 
That Act will be discussed in more detail below. While country-based 
measures may be authorised by the Security Council under Articles 39 and 41 
of the UN Charter, this article will confine its discussion to unilateral 
sanctions.14  
 
Product-based sanctions, the second sub-category of outwardly directed 
measures, discriminate against goods based on the process by which they 
were manufactured. For example, restrictions on imports that have been 
manufactured using forced labour would be categorised as product-based 
measures.  
 
It is important to make these distinctions. As Dommen has noted, “[t]he 
political will to consider these two different types of human rights concerns 
[inwardly directed versus outwardly directed trade measures] is very 
                                                
12 The right to health is set out in Article 12 of the International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature December 16, 1966, 993 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) (‘ICESCR’). The right to health is 
considered not to be confined to the right to health care, but embraces a wide range 
of factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life including 
access to safe water, access to food and nutrition and a healthy environment. Caroline 
Dommen, ‘Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization: 
Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies’ (2002) 24(1) Human Rights Quarterly 1, 
18-19. 
13 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub.L, 108-61, ss. 1-9, 117 Stat 
864, 864 – 871 (‘Burmese Freedom Act’) 
14 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (entered into force 24 October 1945) (‘UN Charter’). 
Multilateral sanctions are discussed briefly below in Section IV. For a discussion of 
the effect of multilateral agreements on WTO obligations see Joost Pauwelyn 
‘Human Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement’, in Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn and 
Elisabeth Bürgi (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 205, 218-219.  
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different”.15 The next section deals with the legal status of each type of 
human rights based measure under WTO law. The conclusions reached may 
not conform to the textual analysis of the WTO Agreements as preferred by 
some authors.16 However, it is not the concern of this section to examine and 
compare alternative interpretations of the WTO texts. Rather, the following 
section constitutes an assessment of what a WTO Panel or Appellate Body 
would be likely to find if it were to follow the reasoning in previous disputes.  
 
 
III WTO JURISPRUDENCE 
 
To date no WTO Panel or Appellate Body17 has ever been called upon to rule 
on a trade measure instituted by a Member for explicit human rights 
objectives.18 Lim reported in 2001 that no Member Country had ever even 
used the phrase “human rights” in a Panel Submission.19 
                                                
15 Dommen, above n 12, 5.  
16 See, for example Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process 
Distinction – an Illusory Basis for Disciplining “Unilateralism” in Trade Policy’ 
(2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 249. 
17 WTO disputes are heard first by a Panel and then may be appealed to the Appellate 
Body. WTO dispute settlement procedures are governed by the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Agreement Establishing 
the WTO, Annex 2, 1869 UNTS 401.  
18 There was a case involving a U.S. law in relation to Burma which was resolved in 
the domestic legal system of the U.S. before it was ever adjudicated by the WTO 
dispute settlement body. In 1997 the European Community requested consultations 
with the U.S. under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and Article XXII of 
the Government Procurement Act regarding an Act enacted by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts on 25 June 1996: An Act Regulating Contracts with Companies Doing 
Business With Burma (Myanmar), 1996 Mass Acts 239, ch. 130. This Act aimed at 
severely restricting the commercial ties between Massachusetts’s state agencies and 
any entities economically tied to Burma. Its aim was to take a stand against the 
repressive government of Burma via trade measures. Because this law was held to be 
unconstitutional it did not need to be pursued under the WTO system. For a detailed 
analysis of the law and the domestic case which resulted see Mark Baker, ‘Crosby v 
National Foreign Trade Council (“NFTC”): Flying Over the Judicial Hump: A 
Human Rights Drama Featuring Burma, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the 
WTO and the Federal Courts’ (2000) 32 Law and Policy in International Business 
51. See also ‘Europe Takes Massachusetts Law to WTO’ Agence France Presse, 
June 20, 1997. There have also been other instances where there could have been a 
challenge made to trade sanctions. For example in 1996 there was a request for the 
establishment of a GATT panel to consider the United States’ Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act. United States – The Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
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Nevertheless, it is possible to examine the existing decisions - particularly 
those decisions which relate to environmental and health issues - in order to 
evaluate the likely legal status of human rights-based trade measures under 
WTO law. This examination is most easily carried out in the context of trade 
in goods which is regulated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).20 The GATT is the longest standing of the WTO Agreements and 
therefore has the most comprehensive jurisprudence.21 The relevant 
principles and provisions of the GATT are replicated in the other main WTO 
Trade Agreements.22  
 
                                                                                                               
Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/2 (1996) (Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the 
European Communities). The panel’s authority lapsed as of 22 April 1998 
(WT/DS38/6, Lapse of the Authority for the Establishment of a Panel). For a 
discussion of the case, see John H Jackson and Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘Helms-
Burton, the US, and the WTO’ ASIL Insight No. 7 (March 1997). 
19 Hoe Lim, ‘Trade and Human Rights: What’s at Issue?’ (2001) 35(2) Journal of 
World Trade 275, 284.  
20 The original GATT was negotiated between 1946 and 1947 and its Oct. 30 1947 
text has been provisionally applied since Jan. 1, 1948. General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, opened for signature 30 October, 1947, 55 UNTS 187 (entered into force 
1 January, 1948). The term GATT 1947 is used to refer to this version of the GATT, 
as subsequently rectified, amended or modified, that existed before the completion of 
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The Uruguay Round was the 
basis upon which the ministers of trade signed the current WTO agreement at 
Marrakesh in 1994. In this article the GATT will refer to the new, legally distinct 
version of the agreement, incorporated into the WTO, which governs trade in goods. 
See above n 2. 
21 In European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas WTO doc WT/DS27/AB/R, AB-1997-2 (1997), [231], (‘EC – Bananas III’) 
the Appellate Body confirmed that GATT jurisprudence could be relevant for 
interpretation of the GATS.  
22 Article XX of the GATT, which contains general exceptions to GATT rules, is 
largely replicated in the GATS article XIV and the Agreement on Government 
Procurement article XXIII. Arguably, GATT article XX applies to determinations 
under certain other Agreements contained in Annex 1A of the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation (for instance the Agreement on 
Agriculture (1867 UNTS 410), Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(1867 UNTS 493) and Agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures (1868 
UNTS 186)). See ‘Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using general 
exemption clauses to protect human rights’ (2005) Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/WTO.pdf> at 20 February 
2006. 
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In the past, several GATT Panels have found particular health or 
environmental measures to be inconsistent with GATT Articles and not 
otherwise justified under GATT Article XX, the exceptions provision 
discussed in detail below. The most significant of the decisions made prior to 
the completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in 1994 include 
the Thai Cigarette Panel,23 the Tuna Dolphin Panel24 and the US 
Automobiles Panel.25 These disputes illustrate the approach taken by pre 
Uruguay GATT Panels when environmental legislation has an unequal 
impact on foreign producers. In all of these cases the article XX exceptions 
were construed narrowly and the environmental legislation was found to be 
GATT illegal. More recently, under the auspices of the WTO, there have 
been a number of significant rulings by WTO Panels and the Appellate Body. 
These include the US – Gasoline dispute,26 the Beef Hormone dispute,27 the 
Salmon dispute,28 the Shrimp Turtle dispute,29 the EC - Asbestos dispute30 
and the recent US - Gambling31 and EC – Biotech disputes.32  
                                                
23 Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT 
BISD 37th Supp. 200, GATT Doc. DS10/R (Report by Panel, adopted November 7, 
1990) (‘Thai Cigarette dispute’) 
24 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD 39th Supp.155, 
GATT Doc. DS21/R (Panel report produced September 3, 1991, never adopted) 
(‘Tuna Dolphin I’) and United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (‘Tuna 
Dolphin II’) GATT Doc. DS29/R (Report by Panel, adopted June 16, 1994) 
(collectively known as the ‘Tuna Dolphin dispute’). 
25 United States - Taxes on Automobiles, GATT Doc. DS31/R (Report by Panel, 
adopted October 11, 1994) (‘US – Automobiles dispute’). 
26 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS2/R (Panel Report), modified by WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-
1(1996) (Appellate Body Report) (’US – Gasoline’). See Jennifer Schultz, ‘The 
Demise of “Green” Protectionism: The WTO Decision on the US Gasoline Rule’ 
(1996) 25 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 1. 
27 The Beef Hormone dispute involved two complaints against the EC, one brought 
by the U.S. and one by Canada. Although the same Panel heard both disputes, it 
issued two separate but similar reports. For the purposes of simplification this article 
will refer to the U.S. Panel Report and Appellate Body Report only. See EC 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. 
WT/DS26/R/USA (1997) (US Panel Report), modified by WTO Doc. 
WT/DS26/AB/R, AB-1997-4 (1998) (Appellate Body Report) (‘EC – Beef 
Hormones’ dispute). 
28 Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Doc. WT/DS18/R 
(1998) (Panel Report), modified by WTO Doc. WT/DS18/AB/R, AB-1998-5 (1998) 
(Appellate Body Report) (‘Australian Salmon dispute’). 
29 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS58/R (1998) (Panel Report), modified by WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, 
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These cases, among others, provide an insight into how a human rights-based 
trade restriction may be interpreted by a WTO Panel or the Appellate Body. 
It should be recognised at the outset that additional considerations which may 
entail a stricter approach being taken to human rights than environmental 
measures would probably be taken into account. Human rights-based 
measures, particularly those related to labour rights, are sometimes said to be 
particularly open to claims of protectionism when compared to environmental 
measures.33 In addition, environmental regulations generally relate to a 
tangible aspect of the global commons and member states therefore have an 
easier task defending their interest in taking action. On the other hand, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has found that all states have a common 
interest in the protection of at least some human rights.34  
 
In its analysis of any trade-based human rights law the WTO DSB would first 
determine whether the measure was GATT illegal. In particular, the DSB 
would decide whether the measure complies with the core WTO principle of 
non-discrimination. If the measure is found to breach that principle, the DSB 
goes on to examine whether the measure could be justified by one of the 
GATT exceptions as set out in Article XX.35  
                                                                                                               
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Appellate Body Report) (Shrimp Turtle dispute). See Jennifer 
Schultz, ‘Balancing the Relationship between Trade and the Environment within the 
World Trade Organisation: Is this the end of the Sea Turtle?’ (1999) 4 Asia Pacific 
Journal of Environmental Law 37. 
30 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R, AB-2000-11 (2001) (Appellate Body 
Report) (‘EC - Asbestos dispute’). 
31 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Betting and 
Gambling Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (2004) (Panel Report), modified by 
WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R, AB-2005-1 (2005) (Appellate Body Report) (‘US - 
Gambling dispute’). 
32 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R (2006) (Panel Report) (‘EC - Biotech 
dispute’). The European Community has declined to appeal the decision. 
33 Howse and Regan, above n 16, 253. From an economic perspective, Howse and 
Regan argue that minimum wage restrictions and similar may disadvantage 
developing nations. They do note, however, that prohibitions on slave labour and 
child labour are much less likely to be controversial: (pp 283 – 4). 
34 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd (Belgium v Spain)[1970] ICJ Rep 3, 
33 (‘Barcelona Traction’).  
35 This two-tiered analysis was employed in US - Gasoline, above n 26, Shrimp 
Turtle, above n 29 and Korea – Measures Affecting the Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/R (US Panel Report), modified by WTO Doc. 
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 A The Non-Discrimination Principle 
 
The principle of non-discrimination is enshrined in Articles I and III of the 
GATT. Article I is known as the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ clause. This clause 
requires that Member States afford equal treatment to ‘like’ imports from all 
WTO Members. Article III, which is known as the ‘National Treatment 
Clause’, states that imports must be treated no less favourably than ‘like’ 
domestic products.  
 
Each type of human rights-based trade restriction identified above in Section 
II (inwardly directed measures and country and product based sanctions) will 
give rise to different discrimination issues. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the potential discriminatory effect of each class individually.  
 
 
1 Country Based Outwardly Directed Measures 
 
It is difficult to defend country-based measures against accusations of 
discrimination. These measures - which place trade restrictions on goods 
from a certain country irrespective of whether the goods themselves are 
associated with human rights abuses - discriminate explicitly on the basis of 
nationality and are therefore prima facie violations of Articles I and III of the 
GATT.36 That is, country-based measures by their very nature treat products 
from one state differently from like domestic and/or imported products.  
 
An early GATT decision to this effect is the Belgian Family Allowances 
decision.37 In Belgian Family Allowances the Panel assessed a Belgian 
government policy which granted certain countries an import tax exemption 
based on whether they maintained an employer tax on family allowances. 
The panel found that the non-product related regulation violated the Most 
Favoured Nation principle.38  
 
                                                                                                               
WT/DS151/AB/R, AB-2000-8 (2000) (Appellate Body Report) (‘Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef’) 
36 Howse and Regan state that such a view is ‘not likely to be controversial’. Howse 
and Regan, above n 16, 250.  
37 Belgian Family Allowances, GATT BISD 1st Supp. 59, at 59-62 (1953).  
38 For a brief discussion of this case see Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Law of 
Environmental “PPMS” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality’ (2002) 27 
Yale Journal of International Law 59, 83-84.  
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A current example of country based measure designed to promote human 
rights is the US Burmese Freedom Act.39 This Act effectively introduces 
unilateral sanctions against Burma in response to the May 30 2003 attack on 
Burmese democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi.40 The Act is also a 
response to the Resolution of the International Labour Conference which 
recommends action against Burma for grave breaches of the International 
Labour Organisation’s (ILO’s) Forced Labour Convention.41  
 
The Burmese Freedom Act seeks to impose an import ban on articles 
produced, mined, manufactured, grown or assembled in Burma.42 The Act 
clearly articulates that the bans are intended to sanction the Burmese military 
junta and strengthen Burma’s democratic forces, support and recognize the 
National League of Democracy as the legitimate representative of the 
Burmese people and for other human rights purposes. Under the Act the 
President has the right to modify or lift the ban if it is shown that sufficient 
progress has been made towards the realisation of core human rights.43  
 
While being a clear example of a violation of the Most Favoured Nation 
principle, a complete analysis of GATT legality would require an 
examination of Article XX exceptions and of the international law 
surrounding inconsistent treaty obligations with reference to the ILO 
Resolution cited above. Such an examination may never become necessary as 
there appears to be tacit international support for the Burmese Freedom Act 
and no complaints have been made to the WTO.44 In fact, the legislation was 
                                                
39 Burma Freedom Act, above n 13.  
40 For information about the arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, see ‘ASEAN tries to avoid 
rift over Burma’ The Age (Melbourne) 17 June, 2003, 8. See also the findings set out 
in section 2 of the Bill, above n 13, 1. 
41 The Resolution recommends that ILO members ‘review, in the light of the 
conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry, the relations that they may have with the 
Member State concerned and take appropriate measures to ensure that the said 
Member cannot take advantage of such relations to perpetuate or extend the system 
of forced or compulsory labour referred to by the Commission of Inquiry’, 
Resolution of the International Labour Conference (88th Session, 2000), 
http://www.union-
network.org/uniindep.nsf/0/42d08ba52349be7dc1256a26003ff3d2?OpenDocument, 
at 15 February 2006; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Cooperation in Dispute Settlement’ in Human 
Rights and International Trade, above n 14, 218-219. 
42 Section 3(a)(1), Burmese Freedom Act, above n 13. 
43 Section 3(b), Burmese Freedom Act, above n 13.  
44 Of course, it may be expected that Burma itself is not happy with the trade 
sanctions. To date, it has not initiated a complaint against the US.  
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not even referred to in the recent Trade Policy Review of the United States in 
the WTO.45 However, were the discriminatory effects of the Burmese 
Freedom Act, or any like legislation, to come into question before a WTO 
panel there is little doubt that it would be found to violate the non-
discrimination principle.  
 
 
2 Outwardly Directed Measures – Product Based 
 
The discrimination issues surrounding trade measures which place non-origin 
contingent restrictions on particular products are more complex. 
Differentiation between products on the basis of the way they were made 
raises the issue of whether such products are ‘like products’ under GATT 
rules. Is a product a ‘like product’ if it is made using a different process or 
production method? The ‘process and production methods’ (PPM) issue 
would be relevant if, for example, a government banned all goods 
manufactured using forced labour. The question of whether the relevant 
goods would be considered ‘like products’ and thus attract the application of 
Articles I and III would be relevant.  
 
There is no definition of the term ‘like product’ in the WTO agreements and 
the issue of whether or not PPMs may be used to differentiate products is a 
matter of interpretation.46 The traditional WTO and GATT jurisprudence 
suggests that PPMs that are not physically evident in the final product cannot 
be used to distinguish between otherwise ‘like products’. The Panel in U.S. 
Automobile Taxes ruled, ‘Article III:4 does not permit treatment of an 
imported product less favourable than that accorded to a like domestic 
product, based on factors not directly related to the product as such.’47  
 
A controversial example of the view that products are ‘like’ unless the 
product itself is affected is found in the Tuna Dolphin dispute.48 In this 
                                                
45 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, ‘Trade Policy and Labour Standards’ 
(2005) 14(2) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 261, 282-283.  
46 For a detailed article discussing environmental PPMs see Charnovitz, above n 38.. 
47US - Automobiles, above n 25, [5.54].  
48 For a discussion of the cases, see, eg, Joel P Trachtman, ‘International Decision: 
GATT Dispute Settlement Panel’(1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 
142; Steve Charnovitz, ‘Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis 
of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices’ (1994) 9(3) American 
University Journal of International Law and Policy 751; Stanley Spracker and David 
Lundsgaard, ‘Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention on the Future of Free Trade 
and Protection of the Environment,’ (1993) 18 Columbia Journal of Environmental 
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dispute there were two Panel decisions which are commonly referred to as 
Tuna Dolphin I and Tuna Dolphin II. Both Panels were asked to determine 
the GATT legality of US restrictions on tuna imports from countries that did 
not meet U.S. standards on dolphin safe fishing practices. In both reports the 
Panels found that the U.S. restrictions were a violation of GATT Article III 
and not within the relevant exceptions in XX (b) and (g) (discussed below). 
The Panels found that the United States was discriminating against ‘like 
products’ based on their production process and that this violated the 
GATT’s Article III national treatment requirement.  
 
In the EC – Asbestos case, the WTO Appellate Body held that when 
determining what constitutes a ‘like product’ four criteria should be 
examined, namely: the physical properties of the products; their end uses; the 
tastes and habits of consumers of those products; and the tariff classification 
of those products.49 In that case the Appellate Body found that chrysolite 
asbestos fibres and certain other fibres collectively referred to as PCG 
fibres50 were not ‘like products’ because they were physically different. 
Although chrysolite asbestos fibres and PCG fibres are substitutable in terms 
of their uses, they were held to be physically different, partly because 
chrysolite asbestos fibres are known to be carcinogenic and also because they 
had different tariff classifications.51 The AB also stated that “the health risks 
associated with a product may be pertinent in an examination of likeness 
under Article III:4”.52 Because the products in EC – Asbestos were held not 
to be ‘like products’ it was therefore lawful to apply different treatment to 
them. This case suggests that characteristics beyond the merely physical may 
render products ‘unlike’. However, the factors considered in EC – Asbestos 
affected the product ‘as such’. It is unlikely that EC – Asbestos decision 
would help a human rights based trade law achieve ‘unlikeness’ because 
human rights considerations will rarely affect the quality and character of the 
end product.  
  
                                                                                                               
Law 385; Thomas Skilton, ‘GATT and the Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-
Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for an International Conservation Strategy’ (1993) 23 
Cornell University Law Journal 455; Jennifer Ramach, ‘Dolphin-Safe Tuna 
Labelling: Are the Dolphins Finally Safe?’ (1996) 15(4) Virginia Environmental Law 
Journal 743. 
49 EC – Asbestos, above n 30, [33].  
50 Polyvinyl alcohol fibres (PVA), cellulose and glass fibres are collectively referred 
to as PCG fibres by the Appellate Body. See EC - Asbestos, above n 30, [84]. 
51 See EC – Asbestos, above n 30, [135]. 
52 See EC – Asbestos, above n 30, [113]. 
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At present the GATT rules and their interpretation by WTO Panels and the 
Appellate Body would probably result in a finding that any outwardly 
directed trade related human rights measures would be a breach of the non-
discrimination principles and therefore prima facie illegal under WTO rules.  
 
 
3 Inwardly Directed Measures 
 
An inwardly directed measure has a greater chance of being assessed as non-
discriminatory. For example, trade restrictions on child pornography 
(attempting to protect the rights of the child)53 would presumably treat all 
child pornography equally, regardless of its origin. Equally, it would be 
expected that in the poultry example given above, the same health 
requirements would apply to all imported and domestic poultry. 
Nevertheless, the line between trade measures designed to protect local 
human rights and those designed to protect local industry is not always clear. 
Consequently accusations of discrimination may be levelled at inwardly 
directed measures.  
 
For example, in the US - Gasoline dispute the US instituted regulations 
specifying the level of cleanliness required of gasoline sold in the US.54 
Venezuela and Brazil argued that the regulations were discriminatory because 
they subjected foreign gasoline producers to a standard pollution baseline 
while domestic refiners were able to establish individual baselines. 
Presumably, if the US had applied the same standard (for example, a 
universal standard baseline) to all market participants, its environmental 
regulations would have been found to be legal under WTO law. By analogy, 
an inwardly directed human rights trade measure which applies equally to 
domestically produced goods and imports should not be seen as a violation of 
the National Treatment principle.  
 
Indirect or de facto discrimination is also prohibited under WTO rules. 
Indirect discrimination occurs where a regulation is not discriminatory on its 
face, but has a discriminatory effect.55 For example, in Malt Beverages,56 a 
                                                
53 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 Nov 1989, 1577 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September, 1990). 
54 US – Gasoline, above n 26.  
55 For an in-depth study of de facto discrimination see Lothar Ehring, ‘De Facto 
Discrimination in WTO Law: National and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment – or 
Equal Treatment?’ (Working Paper 12/01, the Jean Monnet Program, 2001).  
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lower excise was applied by a Mississippi law to all wines in which a certain 
grape variety was used. The excise did not discriminate against any Member 
States on its face. However, it discriminated in effect as the particular grape 
variety only grew in Mississippi and the Mediterranean.57 
 
Furthermore, states are not at liberty to institute any level of protection they 
please, even in the absence of discrimination. For example, the WTO 
provides for certain minimum standards under the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).58 These 
Agreements confirm that Members can adopt trade measures to, for example, 
protect public health, but only if the measures conform with the requirements 
of the Agreements. 
 
 
4 SPS Agreements and Health Measures 
 
The WTO has asserted that these WTO Agreements are not intended to 
appropriate states’ freedom to determine and set appropriate standards and 
Member States are allowed a level of autonomy. In Australian Salmon the 
Appellate Body stated, regarding the SPS Agreement:59 
 
The determination of the appropriate level of protection, a notion defined in 
paragraph 5 of Annex A, as "the level of protection deemed appropriate by 
the Member establishing a sanitary … measure", is a prerogative of the 
Member concerned and not of a panel or of the Appellate Body.  
 
Nevertheless, decisions such as the WTO Appellate Body’s EC – Beef 
Hormone have caused questions to be asked about the whether the WTO has 
intruded too far into Member State’s policy-making space. The EC – Beef 
Hormone decision has been seen as evidence that WTO Agreements 
adversely affects Member countries’ ability to set their own health policies 
and environmental standards.60  
                                                                                                               
56 United States – Measures affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, 19 June 1992, 
GATT Doc. DS23/R (‘Malt Beverages’) 
57 Ibid, [5.23] – [5.26]. See also Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, and 
Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law Practice and Policy 
(OUP, Oxford, 2003), p. 174. 
58 The SPS and TBT Agreements are part of Annex 1A of the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO, above n 2.  
59 Australian Salmon, above n 28, Appellate Body Report [199].  
60 Dommen, above n 12, 17 – 21. 
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In the EC – Beef Hormone case Canada and the U.S. lodged a complaint 
against the EU for a ban imposed in the 1980s on the sale of meat produced 
using several growth hormones, on the grounds that the hormones may be 
carcinogenic. The WTO Panel and Appellate Body [AB] found in favour of 
the U.S. and Canada that the ban contravened the SPS Agreement. The AB 
stated that the right of states to determine their own level of protection ‘is not 
an absolute or unqualified right’.61 A measure must only be applied to the 
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health and must be 
‘specifically supported’ by a risk assessment.62 In EC – Beef Hormone the 
Appellate Body was not satisfied that the EC’s trade ban was based on a 
sufficient risk assessment. Furthermore, the Appellate Body did not accept 
that the bans could be justified under the “precautionary principle”, so as to 
allow the EU to take a cautious approach in implementing health measures.63 
 
The decision has been heavily criticised and the WTO was accused of 
disallowing health regulations aimed at potentially unsafe practices. The 
Appellate Body was criticised for making a decision based largely on trade 
considerations whilst giving little comparative consideration to the interests 
of public health and environmental policy, with the latter being better served 
by a precautionary approach. Dommen uses this case as an example of a 
WTO decision that effectively undermines human rights, in particular the 
right to health.64 
 
Similar criticisms have been levelled at the recently released EC – Biotech 
Panel decision,65 although some analysts suggest such criticism may have 
been premature.66 The Panel found that between 1998 and 2003 the EU had 
                                                
61 EC – Beef Hormones, above n 27, Appellate Body Report [173].  
62 For a discussion of the substantial requirements of risk assessment see Christopher 
Charlier and Michel Rainelli, ‘Hormones, Risk Management, Precaution and 
Protectionism: An Analysis of the Dispute on Hormone-Treated Beef Between the 
European Union and the United States’ (2002) 14(2) European Journal of Law and 
Economics 83, 87-88.  
63 EC – Beef Hormones, above n 27, Appellate Body Report [120] – [125], [245]. 
64 See generally, Dommen, above n 12, at 17-21.  
65 Adrien Bebb, a campaigner from Friends of the Earth Europe stated shortly after 
the Panel’s preliminary conclusions were leaked that “[t]he WTO has bluntly ruled 
that European safeguards should be sacrificed to benefit biotech corporations”. See 
Paul Geitner and Andrew Pollack, ‘A Line in the Sand Over WTO’s Modified Food 
Ruling’, International Herald Tribune, 9 February 2006, 3 and 11.  
66 See Natalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Maria Julia Oliva, Centre for 
International Environmental Law (2006) at 
<http://www.ciel.org/Publications/EC_Biotech_Mar06.pdf>, p. 50, at 4 December 
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instituted a de facto moratorium on the approval of biotechnology products. 
The moratorium was deemed to be inconsistent with Article 8 the SPS 
Agreement which requires that regulatory decisions be made without ‘undue 
delay’. The Panel also ruled that the six EC countries that banned EC-
approved biotech products were violating trade rules, as the restrictions were 
not based on adequate risk assessments. In making these determinations, the 
Panel called attention to the fact that it was not assessing the EC’s right to 
consider the possible risks prior to giving approval to biotech products, nor 
was it assessing the safety of biotech products or whether they are ‘like’ their 
general counterparts.67 As such, the decision may be seen as largely 
procedural, rather than having an substantive impact. Indeed, in declining to 
appeal, the EC stated that ‘the impact of that judgment is entirely of historical 
interest’, as it related to the approval processes operating prior to 2004.68 
 
The most significant aspect of the decision from the perspective of those 
seeking to use the WTO to enforce human rights obligations is the treatment 
of multilateral environmental agreements by the Panel. One of the defences 
mounted by the EC was that its moratorium was justified under the 2000 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (‘Biosafety Protocol’),69 a protocol to the 
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (‘CBD’)70 to which the EC was a 
party. Of the complainants, Canada and Argentina had ratified the CBD, 
whilst the US had signed it. In respect of the Biosafety Protocol, Canada and 
Argentina had both signed the Protocol, whilst the US participated in the 
Protocol’s Clearing House Mechanism on biosafety. 
 
The Panel began by examining Art. 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.71 Article 31(1)(c) requires a treaty interpreter to take into 
                                                                                                               
2006 where it is observed that ‘[i]n light of the distorted representations of the 
Panel’s findings following the issuance of the Interim Report in early February 2006, 
it is important to point out that the Panel report is far from being the clear-cut victory 
for the complaining parties reflected in the press.’ 
67 EC – Biotech, [8.2]. 
68 See ‘EU Won’t Appeal WTO Ruling on GMO Moratorium’, Reuters, 22 
November 2006, at 
<http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/39102/story.htm> at 4 
December 2006. 
69 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, opened for signature 29 January, 2000, 39 ILM 
1097 (entered into force 11 September, 2003). 
70 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June, 1992, 1760 
UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December, 1993). 
71 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May, 1969, 
1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January, 1980). (‘VCLT’) 
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account ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.’ The Panel determined that this provision could not 
mean a treaty which applies only to one party. In fact, the Panel concluded 
the provision could not mean any treaty to which any party to the dispute was 
not a party. In other words, the fact that the US had not ratified the CBD 
meant that the Panel was not required to interpret the WTO agreement in 
light of the CBD.72 Similar logic applied to rule out the use of the Biosafety 
Protocol in considering the meaning of the WTO agreement.73 
 
The Panel then turned to the EC’s argument that, following Shrimp Turtle, 
the Panel could use the CBD and the Biosafety Protocol to assist in the 
interpretation of the WTO agreement.74 The Panel agreed that it could do so, 
but that it was not required to do so.75 Ultimately, it concluded, without 
further explanation, that it was not appropriate or useful to do so.76 
 
This aspect of the decision is significant in the human rights context. At 21 
February 2006, the Biosafety Protocol has been ratified by 132 nations and 
signed by a further 61,77 and so could not be described as an unpopular or 
marginal treaty. Utilising the approach taken the Panel in EC – Biotech, it is 
possible that measures sought to be justified on the basis of human rights 
treaties (even those of almost universal, acceptance) might well be defeated 
by countries which are not party to them. Indeed, there is unlikely to be any 




5 The TBT and Labelling 
 
The TBT Agreement regulates technical barriers to trade. It is possibly 
controversial from a human rights viewpoint due to the effect it might have 
                                                
72 EC – Biotech¸ [7.74]. 
73 EC – Biotech, [7.75]. 
74 EC – Biotech, [7.91]. 
75 EC – Biotech, [7.93]. 
76 EC – Biotech, [7.95]. 
77 See the Biodiversity Convention Secretariat website, 
<http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx?sts=rtf&ord=dt#td>, at 4 
December 2006.  
78 For example, the most ratified human rights treaty is the Convention on the Right 
of the Child, 20 Nov. 1989, 1577 UNTS 3. However, the US is not a party to that 
treaty. Furthermore, some WTO members are unable to ratify human rights treaties 
as they are not States, such as Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, and the EC. 
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on product labelling schemes. The issue is whether a mandatory79 or 
voluntary80 government81 labelling scheme which highlights the use of 
environmentally favourable practices in producing a product such as a 
dolphin friendly label, or a label illustrating a good human rights approach 
such as a ‘no sweatshop’ label, fall within the definition of a ‘technical 
regulation’ or ‘standard’ under the TBT Agreement.82 It is unclear whether 
the definitions catch only those labels that directly relate to the product (such 
as labels with an impact on product characteristics such as quality, packaging 
or recycled content) or whether labels that are based on PPMs that do not 
relate to the product itself would be covered (such as the ‘no sweat shop’ 
label). This issue was being discussed as part of the work of both the WTO 
                                                
79 Mandatory government sponsored schemes are government mandated programs 
that require products to carry labels which convey environmental or human rights 
information about the product to the consumer. An example of mandatory 
government sponsored labelling is legislation which was adopted in 1992 by Austria 
which aimed at stopping all imports of tropical timber and tropical timber products 
from areas that were not sustainably managed. The legislation provided for 
mandatory labelling of tropical timber and timber products with a quality mark and 
imposed a 70% import tariff on all products without the mark. Austria was forced to 
amend the law when Indonesia and Malaysia threatened legal action before a GATT 
panel. See Brian F Chase, ‘Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The Legality of 
Unilateral Attempts to Promote Sustainable Development under the GATT’ (1994) 
17(2) Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 349. 
80 Germany’s ‘Blue Angel’ program is one of the most well known voluntary 
government sponsored schemes. Producers can propose a product for the award of a 
‘Blue Angel’ and there is a process for approval that needs to be completed before 
such an award is granted. A number of countries have developed programs based on 
the ‘Blue Angel’ program. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Environmental Labelling in OECD Countries, 43 (1991). 
81 Another category is non government schemes which are organised and 
administered by bodies other than governments. First party eco labelling or self 
declaration labels are an example. In such cases labels are placed on products by the 
producer, retailer or by a trade industry. Independent third party certification also 
falls into the non government category. These are not likely to be challenged under 
the WTO as they are not government sponsored. 
82 See Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, WTO Doc. 
WT/CTE/1 (1996). TBT Agreement above n 13, annex I paragraph 1 defines the term 
‘technical regulation’ for the purposes of the agreement as: ‘Document which lays 
down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, 
including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is 
mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method.’ 
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Committee on Trade and Environment and the TBT Committee.83 The 
Committee on Trade and Environment appears to have concluded that the 
matter is one for the TBT Committee.84 In its Third Triennial Review in 
2003, the TBT Committee noted that the issue had been brought to its 
attention and that it would continue to deal with it,85 but it does not appear to 
have been considered at the Fourth Triennial Review in 2006.86 If labels are 
regulated under the TBT, that circumstance has ramifications for consumers’ 
rights to freedom of information,87 and, perhaps other rights.88 
 
In conclusion, existing WTO jurisprudence indicates that any outwardly 
directed human rights-based trade measure will be deemed to violate the 
WTO’s non-discrimination principle. In contrast, a legitimate inwardly 
directed measure (that is, one that is not a cover for some protectionist 
purpose) may be legal under WTO law if its application does not suggest 
direct or de facto discrimination, and so long as it complies with the 
requirements of WTO agreements such as the SPS and TBT. 
 
 
 B Article XX Exceptions 
 
Even if a measure is found to be discriminatory it may be protected under 
Article XX of the GATT. Insofar as it is relevant to human rights based trade 
measures, Article XX states:  
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures: 
 
                                                
83 See www.wto.org/english/trtop_e/dohaexplained_e.htm at 4 December 2006. 
84 See http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/envir_e/cte03_e.htm#ecolabelling at 4 
December 2006. 
85 See Third Triennial Review Report, WTO Doc. G/TBT/13 (2003), [58] – [62]. 
86 See Fourth Triennial Review Report, WTO Doc. G/TBT/19 (2006). 
87 See Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened 
for signature 16 December, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March, 
1976) (‘ICCPR’). 
88 For example, given the concerns regarding the right to health arising from GM 
foods (which are explicitly now decided upon in EC-Biotech), a prohibition on 
labelling could arguably jeopardise the right to health. 
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(a) necessary to protect public morals;89  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
… 
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;  
… 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption …90 
 
Of the listed exceptions, it may be noted that paragraph (e) is extremely 
narrow, and arguably does not concern human rights abuse.91 
 
Two conditions need to be satisfied in order for any human rights-based trade 
measure to attract the protection of Article XX. First, the measure would 
need to fall within the scope of at least one of the specific exceptions listed in 
Article XX. Second, the measure would need to conform to the requirements 




1 The Listed Exceptions 
 
To show that a regulation falls under one of the listed exceptions a Member 
state needs to demonstrate that the measure is designed to protect the relevant 
                                                
89 GATS Article XIV corresponds with GATT Article XX. However, there are a 
number of differences, one being that GATS makes an exception for measures 
designed to protect public morals or to maintain public order. GATT Article XX(a) 
only refers to public morals. 
90 Environmental protection impacts on a number of human rights. For example, 
environmental pollution can harm enjoyment of the right to health and the right to 
food and water. The latter rights are protected under article 11 of the ICESCR, above 
n 12, which generally guarantees a right to an adequate standard of living. 
91 For example, article 8(3) of the ICCPR, above n 87, which prohibits forced labour, 
permits prison labour in some circumctances. Paragraph (e) was inserted into Article 
XX to protect against unfair competition, rather than for humanitarian reasons: 
Lorand Bartels, ‘Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction’, (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 353, 356. Of course, some forms of 
prison labour do breach human rights. 
92 Salman Bal, ‘International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: 
Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT’ (2001) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 
62.  
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public policy interest and that the measure is ‘necessary’ to pursue that 
interest.93  
 
The UN Report, Globalization and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of 
Human Rights states that:94 
 
The exceptions referred to [in Article XX] call to mind the protection of the 
right to life, the right to a clean environment, the right to food and to health, 
the right to self determination over the use of natural resources, the right to 
development and freedom from slavery to mention a few. 
 
Under the Report’s interpretation a trade measure that is designed to protect 
human rights would have no great difficulty fitting into one of the listed 
exception categories.95 However, the trade experts on WTO Panels will not 
necessarily agree with this reading. For example, in examinations of Article 
XX (b) WTO DSBs have focused on whether the product itself is supposed to 
cause the risk to human health.96 In the case of inwardly directed measures 
where an import ban is directed at a dangerous product this requirement may 
well be satisfied.97 Bartels states that “it is relatively uncontroversial to say 
that the exception for measures “necessary to protect human …life or health” 
should permit a WTO Member to impose trade restrictions necessary to 
safeguard the human rights within its territory.”98 However, in the case of 
outwardly directed human rights measures (for example, a ban on the import 
of products manufactured in dangerous working conditions) “the connection 
between the product and the risk is far more attenuated” and an argument 
made under Article XX(b) is unlikely to be successful.99  
 
It is the ‘public morals’ exception in Article XX(a) that has the greatest 
potential to shield a human rights-based trade measure from GATT 
illegality.100 It has been argued that this Article might be invoked to justify, 
                                                
93 US – Gambling, above n 31, Panel Report [6.455].  
94 Globalization and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights: Preliminary 
Report of the Secretary General, [17], UN Doc. A/55/342 (2000).  
95 Articles XX(a) , (b) and (g) are the most obvious candidates in the GATT. 
96 Tatjana Eres, ‘The Limits of GATT Article XX: A Back Door for Human Rights?’ 
(2004) 35 Georgetown Journal of International Law 597, 617-618.  
97 To gain the protection of Article XX the measure would also have to meet the 
‘necessity’ requirement which is discussed below.  
98 Bartels, above n 91, 354. 
99 Eres, above n 96, 618.  
100 Stephen J. Powell, ‘The Place of Human Rights Law in the World Trade 
Organisation Rules’ (2004) 16 Florida Journal of International Law 219, 223. 
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for example, trade sanctions against products that involve the use of child 
labour or the denial of workers’ basic core rights.101  
 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies considered the public morals exception 
for the first time in its recent decision in United States – Measures Affecting 
the Cross-Border Supply of Betting and Gambling Services.102 In the US - 
Gambling dispute, both the Panel and the Appellate Body found that the US 
had instituted market access restrictions on the remote supply of gambling 
services (internet gambling) which were prima facie contrary to GATS. The 
US argued, inter alia, that: 
 
“Maintaining a society in which persons and their property exist free of the 
destructive influence of organised crime is both a matter of ‘public morals’ 
and one of ‘public order’. Protecting children from uncontrolled gambling 
settings is certainly a matter of ‘public morals’.”103 
 
The Appellate Body agreed that these measures were generally necessary to 
protect public morals and public order. However, beyond defining public 
morals as “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf 
of a community or nation”, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body gave 
much guidance as to what is meant by the public morals exception.104  
 
Nevertheless, many human rights could fall under that definition. Howse has 
stated: 
 
“In the modern world, the very idea of public morality has become 
inseparable from the concept of human personhood, dignity and 
capacity reflected in fundamental rights. A conception of public 
morals or morality that excluded notions of fundamental rights would 
simply be contrary to the ordinary contemporary meaning of the 
concept.”105 
                                                
101 Robert Howse, ‘The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers’ 
Rights’ (1999) 3 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 131. This article has 
been examined and criticized in Yasmin Moorman, ‘Integration of ILO Core Rights 
Labour Standards into the WTO’ (2001) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
555. 
102 US – Gambling, above n 31. 
103 US – Gambling, above n 31, Panel Report [6.457].  
104 US – Gambling, above n 31, Appellate Body Report [296] – [299].  
105 Robert Howse, “Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle? Almost but not quite yet: 
India’s short-lived challenge to labour and environmental exceptions in the 
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Further, it would be surprising if WTO law allowed for children to be 
protected from the dangers of gambling but not, for example, from the 
dangers of hazardous working conditions.  
 
 
2 The Necessity Requirement 
 
Arguments about whether a measure is designed to protect public morals or 
any of the other Article XX categories need to be assessed on a case by case 
basis. However, previous WTO cases indicate that it is not this requirement 
that is most difficult to meet. Rather, it tends to be more difficult to convince 
a panel or the Appellate Body that the relevant measure is ‘necessary’ to 
pursue the relevant human rights objective. While the WTO’s interpretation 
of the term ‘necessary’ is not as restrictive as it once was, 106 it remains a 
strict standard. In the Korea – Various Measures on Beef dispute the 
Appellate Body stated that:107  
 
[T]he term "necessary" refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of 
necessity. At one end of this continuum lies "necessary" understood 
as "indispensable"; at the other end, is "necessary" taken to mean as 
"making a contribution to." We consider that a "necessary" measure 
is, in this continuum, located significantly closer to the pole of 
"indispensable" than to the opposite pole of simply "making a 
contribution to". 
 
In that same case the Appellate Body articulated the ‘weighing and balancing 
test’ which is used to determine whether a trade measure is sufficiently 
‘necessary’ in the pursuit of the relevant Article XX public policy 
exception.108 The Appellate Body stated that the decision:109  
                                                                                                               
European’s Union’s generalized system of preferences’ (2003)18 American 
University International Law Review 1333, 1368.  
106 The necessity test used in United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
GATT BISD 36th Supp, 345, [5.27] (‘US – Section 337’) (Report by Panel Adopted 7 
November 1989) was the ‘least GATT-inconsistent test’ which required Members to 
exhaust all other possible measures that were less GATT-inconsistent than the 
measure complained of.  
107 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, above n 35, Appellate Body Report [161].  
108 In this case the Appellate Body was making a determination under Article XX(d) 
of the GATT. However, it’s reasoning is transferable to any case in which the 
‘necessity’ of a trade measure is in question.  
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[I]nvolves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series 
of factors which predominantly include the contribution made by the 
compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at 
issue, the importance of the common interest or values protected by 
that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of that law or 
regulation on imports or exports. 
  
The ‘weighing and balancing’ test was also utilised in EC - Asbestos110 and 
US - Gambling.111 When applying the ‘weighing and balancing’ test the 
relevant DSB should also consider whether “an alternative measure which [a 
member] could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not 
inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it”.112  
 
The importance of the values protected by human rights law is generally 
recognised by States, as evidenced by the widespread ratification of human 
rights treaties.113 There is a good case to be made that a high level of 
deference should be granted to a government regulating to protect human 
rights.114 Despite this, it is unlikely that an outwardly directed human rights 
sanction would be deemed ‘necessary’ when subjected to the weighing and 
balancing test. The ‘reasonable availability’ of other measures and the effect 
of such a measure on imports are likely to weigh heavily against a finding of 
necessity. Import bans are unlikely to be the least trade restrictive measures 
available to a member state pursuing human rights objectives.115 For 
example, an import ban on goods manufactured using child labour has the 
potential to worsen the situation for the children affected,116 and also may 
prove totally ineffective in combating child labour.117  
                                                                                                               
109 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, above n 35, Appellate Body Report [164] – 
[166].  
110 EC – Asbestos, above n 30, [172].  
111 US – Gambling, above n 31, Panel Report [6.475] – [6.487].  
112 US – Section 337, above n 106, [5.26].  
113 For information on the ratification of international human rights treaties see < 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/RatificationStatus.pdf > at 14 February 
2006. It must however be conceded that there is divergence over the interpretation of 
the broad standards in the core UN human rights treaties. 
114 United Nations, ‘Human Rights and World Trade Agreements’, above n 22, 15. 
Also see EC – Asbestos, above n 30, [172].  
115 See Zagel, above, n 6, 13.  
116 On the positive side the child would not be forced to work and may potentially go 
to school. On the negative side is the fact that income from the child’s labour would 
not be available to the child and his/her family. There is also the problem that 
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An inwardly directed human rights measure will come up against the same 
challenges. It might be difficult to measure the effectiveness of human rights 
measures.118 Indeed, it is the opinion of many that “[m]ost unilateral, trade-
restrictive measures designed to promote human rights are grossly 
ineffective”.119 However, the Appellate Body’s decision in EC – Asbestos 
indicates that an inwardly directed human rights based trade measure could, 
in certain circumstances, be deemed ‘necessary’. Despite having found that 
the products in question were not ‘like’,120 so the non-discrimination 
principles were not activated, the Appellate Body went on to confirm the 
Panel’s decision that French Decree complained of was "necessary to protect 
human … life or health" within the meaning of Article XX(b) of the 
GATT.121 The issue that arose was whether “controlled use” of chrysolite 
asbestos fibres was a reasonably available, less GATT inconsistent 
alternative to the French government’s outright ban. The Appellate Body 
decided that controlled use would not allow France to achieve its chosen 
level of protection which was identified to be a halt in the spread of asbestos-
related health risks.122 If a Member state decided to institute an import ban to 
protect public morals or human life and health the reasoning in EC – 
Asbestos may provide protection if it can be shown that the ban is the only 
way to achieve the level of protection desired.  
 
In conclusion, because of the unlikelihood of an outwardly directed measure 
ever being the least GATT-inconsistent option, the benefits of Article XX 
protection will probably only extend to inwardly protected measures. Even 
then the government instituting the regulations would have to show that the 




                                                                                                               
children who are no longer employed may turn to other more dangerous and 
exploitative types of work such as prostitution. See ‘Human Rights: Ethical 
Shopping’ The Economist, 3 June 1995, reporting on the observations of Caroline 
Lequesne of Oxfam after visiting Bangladesh.  
117 See below, note 146. 
118 Sarah Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of 
Compatibility’ (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law 133, 145.  
119 Eres, above n 96, 631; see also Zagel, above n 6, 25. The questionable 
effectiveness of sanctions in achieving human rights objectives is discussed below in 
Section IV.  
120 See discussion above in Section 3.A.II. 
121 EC – Asbestos, above n 30, [175].  
122 EC – Asbestos, above n 30, [173] – [174].  
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3 The Chapeau Requirements 
 
Even if Article XX (a), (b), or (g) catches a human rights-based trade 
measure, there is still the problem that historically the WTO DSBs have 
interpreted the chapeau of Article XX narrowly. The chapeau requires that a 
measure not be applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail’ or ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’. The 
focus of the chapeau is therefore on the application of the trade measure. In 
US – Gasoline the Appellate Body wrote:123 
 
The Chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions 
of Article XX may be invoked as a legal right, they should not be so 
applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of 
the right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement. 
 
In US - Gambling, one US statute was found to breach GATS even though 
the restrictions on internet gambling at issue were generally found to be 
necessary to protect public morals. The federal Interstate Horseracing Act 
was found to possibly permit domestic service suppliers to offer internet 
gambling but not offshore suppliers. Of course, the threat posed to public 
morality by US supplied internet gambling facilities was no less than that 
posed by those supplied from abroad.124 
 
The difficulty that arises is that a trade measure designed to protect human 
rights can look the same as one designed for protectionist purposes. In 
assessing whether the measure complies with the chapeau requirements a 
Panel or Appellate Body is likely to look for proof of prior negotiation with 
the affected States. In addition, the Chapeau has been interpreted as a barrier 
to the unilateral imposition of policy standards from one Member state to 
another. Both of these issues were examined in the Shrimp Turtle dispute.  
 
In the Shrimp Turtle dispute the environmental regulation in question was 
ultimately found to be GATT illegal because the law was applied in a manner 
that constituted both ‘arbitrary discrimination’ and ‘unjustifiable 
discrimination’. The dispute involved U.S. legislation designed to protect sea 
turtles, which had the effect of banning imports of shrimp caught using 
certain fishing practices, from entering the U.S. market. When finding that 
the U.S. had applied the law in a manner that constituted ‘arbitrary 
                                                
123 US – Gasoline, above n 26, Appellate Body Report p. 22.  
124 US – Gambling, above n 31, Appellate Body Report [371] – [372]. 
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discrimination’, the Appellate Body noted that the U.S. had taken insufficient 
account of whether shrimp exporting countries targeted by the law had 
special conditions that would work against implementation of a U.S. style 
conservation program, or whether these countries had in place other programs 
to protect sea turtles.125  
 
 
On the issue of unjustifiable discrimination, the Appellate Body stated that 
the U.S. had not made sufficient efforts to negotiate an arrangement to 
protect sea turtles with the complaining countries. They noted that the U.S. 
had negotiated and concluded a regional international agreement for the 
protection of sea turtles - The Inter-American Convention.126 The effect of 
these negotiations was discriminatory in that the U.S. failed to negotiate with 
other Members, notwithstanding the fact that law in question itself contained 
a statutory direction to initiate negotiations for the development of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements. In addition they found that the U.S. allowed the 
complaining countries a shorter phase in period for compliance with the law 
than countries in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
 
The Appellate Body also criticised the intended and actual coercive effect of 
the disputed measure on the specific policy decisions made by foreign 
governments. The effect of the trade embargo in that case was that it required 
other WTO Members to adopt essentially the same policies and enforcement 
practices as the U.S. in relation to the protection of sea turtles. The Appellate 
Body noted that: 127  
 
‘it is not acceptable in international trade relations for one WTO 
Member to use an economic embargo to require other Members to 
                                                
125 The regulation in dispute outlined a certification process whereby the U.S. 
officially certified that foreign countries have adopted fishing policies that 
adequately protect sea turtles. Without this certification, and the evidence to support 
it, the United States was required to block the importation of shrimp and shrimp 
products from the foreign country in question. The Appellate Body criticised the 
rigidity and lack of flexibility involved in making a determination for certification 
and the fact that there was no process for review, or appeal from a denial of an 
application, which meant the determinations lacked fairness and due process. See 
Jennifer Schultz, above n 29, 48-49 for a detailed examination of the legislation in 
dispute. 
126 Opened for signature on 1 December 1966 and signed by 5 countries - Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela. 
127 Shrimp Turtle, above n 29, Appellate Body Report [164]. 
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adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, to 
achieve a certain policy goal, without taking into consideration 




In Shrimp Turtle when interpreting Article XX(g) the Appellate Body did 
suggest that a State could extend national conservation measures to activities 
beyond their national jurisdiction if it showed a legitimate interest and also 
demonstrated that the policy was recognized as desirable. According to this 
reasoning the U.S. had jurisdiction to protect the migratory turtles, as the 
challenged fishing practices had effects in U.S. territorial waters.128 The 
problem was the way in which the U.S. had exercised its jurisdiction.  
 
 
In response to the Appellate Body’s decision the US revised its legislation to 
allow for imports of shrimp that were caught using methods ‘comparable in 
effectiveness’ to those used by the US. When Malaysia complained about the 
new U.S. regulations both the newly formed Panel and the Appellate Body 
found in favour of the United States. They justified this decision saying that 
the revised policy “gives sufficient latitude to the exporting member with 
respect of the programme it may adopt to achieve the level of effectiveness 
required”.129 The U.S. retained an obligation to maintain “ongoing serious, 
good-faith efforts to reach a multilateral agreement”.130  
 
 
The WTO’s preference for multilateral environmental policies was also 
prevalent in the two Tuna Dolphin disputes. In the GATT Panel decision in 
Tuna Dolphin I it was held that the U.S. was not permitted to apply an 
environmental law extra jurisdictionally under Article XX(b) or (g).131 
                                                
128 See Shrimp Turtle, above n 29, Appellate Body Report [133]: ‘We observe that 
sea turtles are highly migratory animals, passing in and out of waters subject to the 
rights of jurisdiction of various coastal states and high seas. … The sea turtles here at 
stake, i.e. covered by Section 609, are all known to occur in waters over which the 
United States exercises jurisdiction.’ 
129 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW, AB-2001-4 
(2001) [144] (Appellate Body Report).  
130 Ibid., [152].  
131 Tuna Dolphin I, above n 24, [5.27]. The Panel further held, at [5.28], that the 
measures were not ‘necessary’ to the objective of protecting animal health under 
Article XX(b) because they were unrelated to a negotiated agreement and also 
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However the Panel in Tuna Dolphin II stated in dicta, that Article XX does 
allow governments to impose extraterritorial measures, provided the 
measures are not designed to coerce other countries into changing their 
policies within their own jurisdiction.132  
 
 
Nevertheless, the Shrimp Turtle disputes indicate that a DSB is going to take 
a dim view of any measure which it views as an attempt to unilaterally direct 
the domestic policy of another country. In the case of outwardly directed 
measures the human rights violation being sanctioned has its cause and effect 
in a country outside the jurisdiction of the regulating state. It is difficult to 
envisage a situation where a trade regulation applied extraterritorially for 
human rights purposes would not be viewed as coercive.  
 
 
Any country-based measure would encounter additional problems due to the 
fact that to fulfil the chapeau requirements a measure must apply equally to 
all countries where the same conditions prevail.133 Human rights violations 
are notoriously difficult to assess and quantify. Further, most states are 
human rights violators on one level or another. Consequently, an accusation 
of arbitrariness might easily stick to most country-based measures.  
 
 
 C Conclusions 
 
A number of barriers to WTO legality face any restrictive trade measure 
designed to protect or promote human rights. The table below represents the 






                                                                                                               
because the quota by which the measure was made effective was based on the 
indeterminate factor (how many dolphins had been caught by U.S. fishermen in a 
given period) and that both the extrajurisdictional nature of the measure and this last 
factor meant that the measures did not ‘relate to’ (that is, were not primarily aimed 
at) the conservation of exhaustible natural resources within the meaning of Article 
XX (g). See [5.33]. 
132 Tuna Dolphin II, above n 24, [5.15]. 
133 Vazquez, above n 9, 823.  
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Table 1  
 
Requirements for 
GATT legality  
Country based  Product based  Inwardly 
Directed  









argument that a 
PPM is GATT 
illegal.  
Possibly. This 
will depend on 
the design and 
effect of the 
specific trade 
measure.  
Does the measure 
comply with the 
SPS and TBT? 
Irrelevant Irrelevant Possibly. 
Even if the measure is discriminatory it may be protected under the Article 
XX Exceptions 
Does the measure 
relate to one of 
the listed 
exceptions?  
Possible under Article XX.  Possibly under 
Article XX.  
Is the measure 
necessary to 
achieve that listed 
goal?  
No, as are not ‘necessary’. Less 
GATT-inconsistent measures are 
available.  
Possibly, if the 
trade measure is 
the only way to 
achieve the level 
of protection 
desired.  
Does the measure 
fulfil the chapeau 
requirements ? 
Irrelevant as the measure is not 
‘necessary’.  
Possibly, if it 
does not have a 
protectionist 
effect or design 




other States.  
Result  GATT illegal  GATT illegal  Potential for 
GATT legality.  
 
In sum, only inwardly directed human rights measures are likely to be 
assessed as legal under WTO law. There are a number of conceptual and 
practical differences between inwardly and outwardly directed measures that 
justify such a distinction. Despite vast changes in the role of sovereignty in 
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the international order, it still provides a relevant framework. It makes sense 
that a sovereign state should be able to define the policies which it deems 
appropriate to protect people within its borders, but should be restricted from 
unilaterally imposing those policies on other states. Also, States have 
international legal responsibilities aside from those under the WTO 
Agreements. Allowing States to protect human rights within their borders 
avoids situations of conflict between obligations under international human 
rights treaties and WTO law.134 Finally, the concerns about outwardly 
directed measures that are discussed in the next Section do not apply to 
inwardly directed measures.  
 
Some human rights advocates may be dissatisfied with this result because it 
restricts the ability of WTO Member States to promote and protect 
international human rights through trade measures. The next section 
considers whether such a concern is justified.  
 
 
IV ARE SANCTIONS THE WAY FORWARD? 
  
Absent the WTO, trade sanctions seem to be a legitimate way for States to 
unilaterally promote human rights abroad. They have been employed on a 
multilateral level with some success in the fight against South African 
apartheid,135 and more recently in response to the human rights violations 
associated with the trade in “conflict diamonds”.136 Both of these are 
examples are of multilaterally endorsed trade measures. It also may be noted 
that multilaterally endorsed trade measures endorsed by the Security Council 
are allowed under Article XXI(c) of the GATT.137 
 
                                                
134 United Nations, ‘Human Rights and World Trade Agreements’, above n 22, 12-
13.  
135 Geoff Simons, Imposing Economic Sanctions: Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool? 
(Pluto Press, 1999) 75-81; Adrienne S. Khoransanee, ‘Sacrificing Burma to Save 
Free Trade: The Burma Freedom Act and the World Trade Organization’ 35 Loyola 
of Los Angles Law Review 1295, 1311.  
136 In 2003 the General Council of the WTO passed the Waiver Concerning Kimberly 
Process Certification of Rough Diamonds (WTO Doc. WT/L/518, 2003) which 
allows the Kimberly Process participants to disregard the non-discrimination 
principle when dealing with trade in rough diamonds associated with gross human 
rights violations.  
137 Article XXI has never been interpreted by the WTO dispute settlement bodies. 
The status of sanctions endorsed by an international body other than the Security 
Council is uncertain. 
       DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                     
VOLUME 12 NO 1 
72
If multilateral trade sanctions have had some success in the past, then why 
should they not also be employed unilaterally? This section examines a few 
of the main reasons why unilateral, outwardly directed human rights 
sanctions may not be the best way to promote human rights including: the 
harmful outcomes that the sanctions themselves can have on the population 
of the target country, the disproportionate effect of such sanctions on the 
trading opportunities of developing countries; and the political and 
institutional limitations of the WTO. 138  
 
 
 A Sanctions and Human Rights 
 
It is widely acknowledged that economic sanctions are not human rights 
neutral and can themselves be the cause of human rights violations. For 
example, the right to life, the right to freedom from inhuman or degrading 
treatment, the right to an adequate standard of living, food, clothing, housing 
and medical care are some of the rights that may be vulnerable to violation 
under trade sanctions.139 Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, has stated 
that:140 
 
…humanitarian and human rights policy goals cannot easily be reconciled 
with those of a sanctions regime. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that 
sanctions are a tool of enforcement and, like other models of enforcement, 
they will do harm.  
 
That economic sanctions may not be the best way to deal with human rights 
violations is attested to by the fact that there are no articles in any of the main 
international human rights treaties which provide for the use of trade 
sanctions as an enforcement measure.141 Indeed, the Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights confirmed in its General Comment 8 on ‘The 
Relationship between Trade Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and 
                                                
138 See also The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of 
Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (2000); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, 
Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 
(Peterson Institute, 2nd ed, 1990, Washington DC). See also Lim, above n 19, 285.  
139 Lim, above n 19, 285. 
140 Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UN GAOR 53rd 
Sess., Supp. No. 1, [64], UN Doc. A/53/1 (1998).  
141 Lim, above n 19, 285.  
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Cultural Rights’ that it ‘has no role to play in relation to decisions to impose 
or not to impose sanctions’. 142 
 
It is usually the poorest and most defenceless in the targeted states who suffer 
the worst effects of the ‘blunt weapon’ of economic sanctions.143 Indeed, one 
of the roles of sanctions is to burden these people in order to incite opposition 
to the ruling regime.144 Meanwhile, it is the political elite (who are generally 
those responsible for the human rights violations in the first place) who are 
likely to be shielded from most of the negative effects of the sanctions.145  
 
In General Comment 8, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
rights outlined some of the detrimental human rights effects of sanctions at 
paragraph 3: 
 
While the impact of sanctions varies from one case to another, the Committee 
is aware that they almost always have a dramatic impact on the rights 
recognized in the Covenant. Thus, for example, they often cause significant 
disruption in the distribution of food, pharmaceuticals and sanitation 
supplies, jeopardize the quality of food and the availability of clean drinking 
water, severely interfere with the functioning of basic health and education 
systems, and undermine the right to work. In addition, their unintended 
consequences can include reinforcement of the power of oppressive élites, the 
emergence, almost invariably, of a black market and the generation of huge 
windfall profits for the privileged élites which manage it, enhancement of the 
control of the governing élites over the population at large, and restriction of 
opportunities to seek asylum or to manifest political opposition. While the 
phenomena mentioned in the preceding sentence are essentially political in 
nature, they also have a major additional impact on the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
These issues are not exclusively relevant to comprehensive country-based 
trade measures. Product based sanctions, which are a type of ‘selective 
sanction’, can also have profound negative effects.146 The example of bans 
                                                
142 UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8, paragraph 9. The Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights monitors the implementation by States parties of the ICESCR (see 
above n 12). 
143 Ibid., [4]; Gary C. Hufbauer and Barbara Oegg, ‘Targeted Sanctions: A Policy 
Alternative?’ (2000) 32 Law and Policy in International Business 11, 11.  
144 Vazquez, above n 9, 837.  
145 Zagel, above n 6, 24.  
146 It should be noted that even these ‘selective’ sanctions are not as well targeted as 
they may appear. For instance, only 5% of the output of child labour is exported, so 
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on goods manufactured using child labour could force children into more 
dangerous areas of economic activity, or leave them without enough money 
to survive.147 For example, in Bangladesh, some children were apparently 
forced into prostitution by destitute parents when the threat of a US bill 
banning products manufactured using child labour led to the discharge of 
children working in the textiles industry.148 The availability of other 
measures, for example those instituted under the International Programme for 
the Eradication of Child Labour of the International Labour Organisation, 
should also be considered in an evaluation of their desirability of 
sanctions.149 
 
Sanctions also have the effect of depriving populations of the benefits that 
come with access to international markets.150 International trade is not 
intended to be an end in itself. The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organisation states that the trade system should 
be ‘conducted with a view to raising standards of living… ensuring full 
employment… and allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development.’151 If these 
objectives were realised then international trade should help to promote 
human rights – particularly economic and social rights. Indeed, “there are 
“few reputable developing country analysts or governments who question the 
positive potential role of international trade or capital inflow in economic 
growth and overall development”.152 Even when the application of the trade 
system is criticised, the benefits of having a trade system at all are generally 
                                                                                                               
the vast majority of offending products would remain unaffected by sanctions: 
Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘The Boundaries of the WTO: Afterword: The Question of 
Linkage’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 126, 132.  
147 See Economist, above n 116. This will not necessarily be the case if appropriate 
support structures and safety nets (e.g. new schools and financial support) are put in 
place to assist children who lose their jobs.  
148 Bhagwati, above n 146, 132.  
149 See International Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour website, 
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/> at 4 December 2006. 
150 United Nations Development Programme, Making Global Trade Work for People 
(2003).  
151 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, opened for signature 15 April, 1994, 1867 UNTS 14, Preamble.  
152 Gerald K. Helleiner, ‘Markets, Politics and the Global Economy: Can the Global 
Economy be Civilized?’ (Paper presented at the Tenth Raul Prebisch Lecture, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 11 December 2000), 3.  
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acknowledged.153 If human rights based trade sanctions are going to do more 
harm than good for the very people they are supposed to be helping then their 
illegality under WTO rules should not be seen as a cause for concern by 
human rights advocates.  
 
 
 B Objections from the South 
 
Developing countries have particular concerns relating to human rights 
involvement in trade issues. Trade advocates from ‘the South’, that is 
developing States, often view unilaterally determined human rights policies 
backed by trade measures as objectionable intrusions on their sovereignty. 
The argument from the South is that such measures constitute protectionist 
devices and are aimed at denying market access to their products and limiting 
their competitive advantage. Regardless of whether this is true in any 
particular instance, it is likely to be the case that a WTO slackening of the 
non-discrimination principle in the name of human rights will be ‘a bone 
down the gullets of the poor countries.’154  
 
In the United Nations Report entitled ‘The Realization of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’, it was noted that there is a deep and well-founded 
distrust of those advocating for trade-human rights linkages.155 The UN 
Report states:156 
 
The tying of trade to human rights in the fashion in which it has so 
far been done is problematic for a number of reasons. In the first 
instance, it too easily succumbs to the charge by developing countries 
of neo-colonialism. Secondly, the commitment of Northern countries 
to a genuinely democratic and human rights-sensitive international 
regime is rendered suspect both by an extremely superficial rendering 
                                                
153 Oxfam reports that “World trade has the potential to act as a powerful motor for 
the reduction of poverty , as well as for economic growth, but that potential is being 
lost. The problem is not that international trade is inherently opposed to the needs 
and interests of the poor, but that the rules that govern it are rigged in favour of the 
rich.” Kevin Watkins and Penny Fowler, Rigged Rules and Double Standards (2002), 
3.  
154 Bhagwati, above n 146, 128.  
155 J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, ‘The Realization of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of Human 
Rights’, UN Commission on Human Rights, 52nd Sess, Provisional Agenda Item 4, 
UN Doc. E/Cn.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (2000). 
156 Ibid, 17. Footnotes omitted.  
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of the meaning of human rights, and by the numerous double 
standards that are daily observed in the relations between countries of 
the North and those of the South.  
 
These concerns are particularly relevant because human rights sanctions are 
more likely to be instituted by rich countries and operate to the detriment of 
poor countries. Unilateral sanctions can only make an impact if they are 
instituted by a state with economic clout. If Burma decided to institute 
sanctions on the US the economic effects would no doubt be negligible 
compared to those caused by the US sanctions on Burma. Sanctions will 
necessarily have a greater effect on poor countries as they are more likely to 
‘be dependent on a small range of export goods and have no slack in the 
economy’.157 The fact that unilateral sanctions are a tool which is effectively 
only available to rich countries is in itself a cause for concern. Their use 
affords rich countries even more control over the functioning of the trade 
system as well as the economic development and evolution of comparative 
advantage in poor countries.  
 
 
 C The WTO’s Institutional Capacity 
 
Proponents of WTO regulated human rights sanctions have set a hard task for 
the WTO. The reality is that economic measures “should not and cannot be 
applied with respect to the entire universe of international human rights 
guarantees. The task is to find out about the core standards that are of 
paramount importance for the protection of human dignity…”158 This is 
problematic because “the universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated nature of human rights gives scope to virtually any civil, political, 
economic, social or cultural issue to be described in terms of human 
rights.”159  
 
Even if the “core standards” are ascertained the need to interpret and evaluate 
them in cases of conflict would remain. Such a responsibility has proven to 
be conceptually and practically difficult even for specialised human rights 
bodies. The international community has not necessarily achieved universal 
consensus about the parameters of human rights obligations and specifically 
                                                
157 Janet Dine, Companies, International Trade and Human Rights (CUP, 
Cambridge, 2005), p. 198. 
158 Cottier, Trade and Human Rights, above n 6, 125.  
159 Lim, above n 19, 287.  
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in this context, the human rights that should be included in the WTO.160 The 
WTO would have to be able to negotiate questions of cultural relativism 
which pertain to the idea that human rights values vary across cultures. While 
cultural relativism arguments can often be challenged, it is nevertheless 
difficult to maintain that there is true unanimity amongst states regarding the 
proper interpretation of human rights.161 
 
The assessment and evaluation of unilateral human rights trade restrictions 
may be beyond the WTO’s institutional capability. The WTO is a relatively 
small body with a limited budget – in 2006 the WTO Secretariat had a budget 
of $134 million US Dollars and a staff of 635.162 Further the Panellists and 
members of the Appellate Body are not human rights experts. This is related 
to the additional concern that if the WTO was to be in charge of determining 
human rights issues, human rights would be subjugated to trade concerns.163 
A United Nations report on trade and human rights suggested that “by using a 
provision of WTO Agreements to raise human rights arguments, countries are 
subjecting those arguments to the WTO legal system, and there are bound to 
be ways in which that system will differ from adjudicatory systems under the 
human rights model.”164 Lim argues that “the WTO dispute settlement 
system is simply neither mandated nor competent to handle such a matter. 
Whether sanctions are permitted or not to bring about the enforcement of 
human rights in third States is ultimately a general issue of public 
international law and not of WTO law.”165  
                                                
160 Jose Alvarez, ‘Trade and the Environment: Implications for Global Governance: 
How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime’ (2001) 7 
Widener Law Symposium Journal 1, 2-3. 
161 See DL Donoho ‘Relativism versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search 
for Meaningful Standards’ (1991) 27 Stanford Journal of International Law 345.  
162 See ‘The WTO Fact File’ at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm> at 20 February 2006. 
The IMF’s annual budget for 2006 is $937 million and had a staff cap of 2802. See 
International Monetary Fund, ‘The FY 2006 Budget and Medium-Term Budgetary 
Framework’, 1 April 2005, at 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/040105.pdf> at 20 February 2006.  
163 This problem could be partially ameliorated if the panels were to seek expert 
advice from UN human rights bodies under Article 13 of the DSU or accept amicus 
curiae briefs from competent NGOs. For more details see Cleveland, above n 118, 
186-187. 
164 United Nations, ‘Human Rights and World Trade Agreements’, above n 22, 15. 
Like Cleveland (see above n 118) the Report suggests that there may be ways around 
this problem if panels and the Appellate Body was willing to call on the expertise of 
human rights specialists.  
165 Lim, above n 19, 286.  
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Compulsory multilateral sanctions, as noted, are within the purview of the 
Security Council. Of course, the Security Council is not a perfect body and 
has its own limitations. Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter only allow for 
sanctions when human rights abuses threaten international peace and 
security.166 The Security Council also has its own institutional difficulties to 
contend with, a fact attested to by its failure to respond adequately to the 
severe human rights violations which took place in Bosnia and Rwanda.167 
Nevertheless the UN Security Council has in the past mandated trade 
sanctions against Iraq, Yugoslavia and Burundi.168 Notwithstanding the 
significant problems associated with the institution of economic sanctions, a 
multilateral determination under the auspices of the Security Council seems 
more appropriate, and certainly more effective, than unilateral actions against 
parties whose only recourse would be through the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism.  
In addition to the Security Council, there are a number of authoritative human 
rights bodies already in existence. Despite not having the capacity to institute 
economic sanctions, bodies such as the UN human rights treaty bodies, the 
new UN Human Rights Council, and the ILO may be better placed than the 
WTO to deal with the human rights concerns of the international community. 
The UN Secretary-General made this case in a 1998 address to the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC):169 
 
Some have suggested using trade rules to achieve goals with respect to 
labour, the environment and human rights. I believe instead that full use 
should be made of the United Nations system to pursue such goals. To 
attempt to use the multilateral trading system to solve problems in these and 
other areas would put it under great strain, and would be much less effective 
than adopting policy solutions in the sectors themselves.  
 
The institutional limitations of the WTO should be considered in an 
evaluation of the utility of unilateral trade sanctions as they, along with the 
other factors mentioned in this section, have the capacity to cause trade 
sanctions to do more harm than good for human rights.  
 
 
                                                
166 UN Charter, above n 14; Cleveland, above n 118, 177.  
167 Cleveland, above n 118, 177.  
168 Lim, above n 19, 287.  
169 ‘Secretary-General Calls for Full Use of United Nations System to Aid Trade 
Liberalization’, UN Doc. SG/SM/6629 – ECOSOC/5762 (1998). Also cited in Lim, 
above n 19, 288.  
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V CONCLUSION 
 
States may reasonably and legitimately wish to act to protect and promote 
human rights. There are a number of ways in which they may go about this, 
trade measures being only one option. This article has discussed whether this 
option is one that is legally available under WTO law. The conclusion that 
has been reached here is that while trade measures aimed at protecting the 
human rights of a state’s own population may on occasion comply with 
obligations under the WTO Agreements, unilateral trade measures aimed at 
protecting people in other states are likely to be found to be illegal under 
WTO law.  
 
This conclusion is based on existing jurisprudence, rather than a textual 
analysis of the agreements themselves. The possibility remains that WTO 
panels or the Appellate Body could alter their interpretative approach. In 
Japan Alcoholic Beverages the Appellate Body stated that “WTO rules are 
not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in 
confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts and real 
cases in the real world.”170  
 
However, as was argued in the previous section, to change or reinterpret 
WTO rules to allow for outwardly directed trade measures would be 
counterproductive in terms of achieving human rights goals. There are better 
ways to go about promoting human rights through trade. In the introduction 
to this article two approaches to addressing human rights concerns through 
trade were mentioned. The first option, not discussed here, was the possibility 
that human rights objectives be somehow mainstreamed into WTO trade 
agreements and their application. In his speech on global governance Pascal 
Lamy suggested that this may be the direction in which the WTO is headed. 
He stated that the WTO Preamble “calls for the consideration of fundamental 
values other than those of market opening to include, for instance, the 
protection of the environment, human rights and other social values.”  
 
In the context of achieving human rights goals, trade is and should remain a 
weapon for defensive purposes only. The enjoyment of human rights 




                                                
170 Japan – Taxes on alcoholic beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS11/AB/R, AB-1996-2 
(1996), p. 31 (Report of the Appellate Body).  
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